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ABSTRACT
An important part of human intelligence is the ability to use language. Humans learn how to use language in a society of  
language users, which is probably the most effective way to learn a language from the ground up. Principles that might  
allow an artificial agents to learn language this way are not known at present. Here we present a framework which begins  
to address this challenge. Our auto-catalytic, endogenous, reflective architecture (AERA) supports the creation of agents  
that can learn natural language by observation. We present results from two experiments where our S1 agent learns  
human communication by observing two humans interacting in a realtime mock television interview, using gesture and  
situated language. Results show that S1 can learn multimodal complex language and multimodal communicative acts,  
using a vocabulary of  100 words with numerous sentence formats,  by observing unscripted interaction between the  
humans, with no grammar being provided to it a priori, and only high-level information about the format of the human  
interaction in the form of high-level goals of the interviewer and interviewee and a small ontology. The agent learns both  
the pragmatics, semantics, and syntax of complex sentences spoken by the human subjects on the topic of recycling of  
objects such as aluminum cans, glass bottles, plastic, and wood, as well as use of manual deictic reference and anaphora. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most useful skills to evolve in humans is the ability to use language. This skill builds on several 
identifiable sub-skills, such as auditory timbre discrimination, sequence learning, fine motor control, and 
context-anchored  learning,  whose  combination  honed  over  generations  has  lead  to  the  diverse  use  of 
language observed in modern human society. The best way to learn language for a human is in a social 
context, where multiple examples of its use can be observed, with numerous examples of successful and 
unsuccessful variations relative to the users' goals, exceptions and contextualized cues and usage help define 
concepts; and where the effect of language use on oneself and other language users occurs naturally, and 
where implicit and explicit "experiments" of language use can be made. If our aim is to create an artificial 
agent that masters the numerous facets and subtleties of language the same is probably true: The agent should 
be situated in some kind of human social context, where it can learn how to use language. The principles 
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necessary for such an agent to be constructed are not known at present, and no architecture exists that comes 
close to supporting the construction of such an agent. 
In this paper we present work on an agent that learns language by observation. The mobility and sensing 
of a situated agent is necessarily constrained by its body; such an agent can neither be assumed to process 
every input available in its environment nor to follow every thought to its ultimate conclusion: Real-world 
agents do not have the resources to accomplish  all the jobs they ideally should, given their goals, due to 
limited computing and memory capacity. These assumptions have some fundamental implications for the 
design of our cognitive architecture AERA (auto-catalytic, endogenous, reflective architecture), based on a 
new constructivist methodology (Thórisson 2012) that puts the autonomy of the agent as a top priority, thus 
doing away with the allonomic1 view on which all common software development methodologies are based, 
where the human programmer provides the system with all its algorithms. Similar to Wang's NARS (Wang 
2011, 2006), AERA is designed around assumptions of self-bootstrapping from incomplete knowledge and 
insufficient resources (Thórisson 2013, Nivel et al. 2012, Wang 2011). An AERA-based agent is provided 
with only a small object ontology, a handful of top-level goals, and optionally a couple of domain-related 
goals to help with the bootstrapping.  Due to our agents being situated in a social interaction scenario and 
being engineered to learn continuously, their knowledge is acquired incrementally over time, based on their 
own experience. 
Figure 1. The realtime interaction between a human and the S1 agent, in the form of a simplified TV  
interview, is conducted in a virtual environment via live tracking of multimodal behavior and speech. 
Dethroning  allonomic  methodologies  means  that  we must  let  go of  the  idea  that  we,  the  designers, 
provide our system with task-specific algorithms, which would mean that we would pick the most important 
tasks the system is to perform, and proceed to implement by hand all the necessary information the system 
needs to  perform them.  Instead  we must  focus on developing  principles  for  the  system itself  to  invent  
algorithms. And we must go even further, for high levels of autonomy means that the system we target must 
1 'Allonomy' is the opposite of autonomy; allonomic controllers may impart some level of autonomy to what they 
control while not being autonomous themselves. 
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constantly be learning, by training itself on appropriate tasks and subtasks, after it leaves the lab. The term 
"algorithm" may not be entirely appropriate for what our autonomous system is learning, because even on 
sequential repeats of the same task the system may be modifying how it does it (cf. Wang 2006), from the 
smallest to the largest subtask. High levels of autonomy mean high levels of domain independence, so we 
also cannot allow ourselves to provide the system mainly with domain-specific knowledge. In fact, in a 
constructivist approach the system development task becomes that of designing a meta-control scheme that, 
instead of  providing hand-coded solutions to specified tasks and subtasks,  must give the system enough 
flexibility and initiative to propose subgoals on its own, based on the drives (highest-level goals) provided by 
the system's designers. 
2. NATURAL LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
Our approach to knowledge representation has its roots in non-axiomatic term logic. Since knowledge in our 
agent is established on the basis of its experience, truth cannot be absolute but is bound to only be established 
to a certain degree and within a certain time interval. In our approach the simplest term thus encodes an 
observation, and is called a fact (or a counter-fact indicating the absence of an observation). A fact carries a 
payload (the observed event), a likelihood value in [0, 1] indicating the degree to which the fact has been 
ascertained and a time interval in microseconds, the period within which the fact is believed to hold (or, in 
the case of a 'counter-fact', the period during which the payload has not been observed). Facts have a limited 
life span, corresponding to the upper bound of their time interval. Payloads are terms of various types, some 
of which are built in the AERA Executive, the most important of these being atomic state, composite state, 
prediction, goal, command, model, success/failure, and performance measurement. Additionally, any type 
can be defined by the programmer, and new types can be created by I/O devices at runtime. 
Except when the agent is in initial stages of bootstrapping (which should only happen once for each new 
environment or domain), a lot of its knowledge will be composite, that is, relationships and combinations 
between small "atomic" knowledge "bricks". In the case of natural language, sentences are structured out of 
sequences of  words,  with fairly  complex relationships and rules  (generally  called 'grammar');  words are 
constructed out of phonemes2 (and letters, which have a rather complex relationship to phonemes). 
To extract such knowledge from observing language-using humans in the real world the agent must have 
the ability to work with partially correct hypotheses about the "rules"3 that guide the process of constructing a 
sentence  with  a  particular  meaning.  To this  end  a  language-learning  agent  would  need  to  represent  its 
experience as contextualized knowledge structures of some kind, with variable levels of complexity, which 
would allow it to change the relationships between the knowledge structures previously acquired in various 
ways at various levels of granularity. For instance, an incorrectly represented abstraction of how to pair nouns 
and verbs so that others understand what we mean might be erradicated when more examples of the various 
ways of its pairing are observed. The speed would be dependent on the efficiency of the agent's processes for 
this purpose, and this is our task here: To implement a system that can produce the necessary hypotheses for 
how "the world works" – in our case how natural language is used – and representing it in a way that allows 
modification  in  a  way  that  moves  the  system towards  increased  accuracy.  In  this  respect  our  work  is 
compatible with e.g. that of Dominey & Boucher (2005), who demonstrated a robot learning language from 
2 'Phoneme' is a construct hypothesized by humans; here it is used as a shorthand for the already-categorized sounds  
that can be used to convey meaning in a human natural language in a modular way. (Our agent is of course not bound  
to such human-hypothesized concepts, as it generates its own knowledge based on its own experience and  
capabilities.)
3 The effective ("correct") use of natural language might be formalizable as explicit rules, but natural language is  
primarily a vehicle for getting things done, and as such may not be so unlike any task with complex contextual  
dependencies and relationships between its atomic operands. 
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limited domain and language-specific knowledge; our work goes further by proposing general principles for 
extracting meaning from observation, as described below (see also Nivel et al. 2013). 
With an aim of generality we wanted to find a representation amenable for representing all kinds of 
experience, that could be used for reasoning operations, and that could scale reasonably well by growing with 
cumulated experience – a homogenous representational scheme. Knowledge in our approach is composed of 
states (be they past, present, predicted, desired or hypothetical) and of executable code – called  models. 
Models  are  capable  of  generating  knowledge,  for  example  predictions,  hypotheses,  and  goals,  and  are 
executed by a virtual machine, the Executive. States and models are low-granularity, as low granularity in 
this respect better supports knowledge plasticity than high granularity due to the fact that modifications to 
small  parts are  less likely to  have detrimental,  unforeseen side-effects.  Low granularity also means that 
higher  levels  of  combinatorics  are  leveraged.  Models  are  at  a  granularity  level  equivalent  to  SOAR's 
production rules (cf. Laird 2012), but while their surface structure has some similarity to these (e.g. having a 
right-hand side and a left-hand side and directly supporting reasoning),  they differ significantly in many 
respects including supporting parallel execution, simultaneous forward and backward chaining, and having 
strong representation of time. Representing time is of course necessary for producing timed behavior; for 
natural language time must be manipulatable at several scales, from the a large-scale composite operation 
(e.g. achieving a mission such as doing a TV interview) to intermediate-size actions (e.g. what utterance will 
elicit a desired answer/information from an interlocutor) to the smallest levels of individual operations (e.g. 
producing a prediction), which is a  necessary requirement of any system that must (a) perform in the real 
world and (b) model its own operation with regards to its expenditure of (temporal) resources. Considering 
time values as intervals allows us to encode the variable precision and accuracy needed to deal with the real 
world, for example, sensors do not always perform at fixed frame rates and so modeling their operation may 
be critical to ensure reliable operation of their controllers and models that depend on their input, and the 
precision  for  goals  and  predictions  may  vary  considerably  depending  on  both  their  time  horizons  and 
semantics. Last, since acquired knowledge can never be certain, one can assume that "truth" – asserting that a 
particular  fact  holds  –  can  only  be  established  for  specific  periods  with  varying  degrees  of  temporal 
uncertainty.
3. AUTO-CATALYTIC ENDOGENOUS REFLECTIVE ARCHITECTURE
To be equipped to learn natural language in situ in human society, an artificial agent needs to be endowed 
with many complex cognitive functions, including the ability to direct its own attention to the right things at 
the right time (cf. Ognibene et al. 2013) and relate sounds to contextual actions and cues. As it bootstraps its 
language knowledge (from possibly meager beginnings) it needs to be capable of classifying events based on 
its own incomplete knowledge of the world at  any point in time, in a  way that it can easily update  its 
knowledge experience is gained. In our approach all knowledge is represented in a way that relates it to the 
passage of time. The architecture has no special sub-components that manage learning, attention, planning, 
dialogue, and so on; instead, communicative learning, planning, and execution are emergent processes that 
result from the same set of low-level processes: These are essentially the execution of fine-grained programs 
– models – that are automatically generated, are reusable and shared system-wide, collectively implementing 
functions that span across the entire scope of the system’s operation in its environment. For example, models 
generate both goals and predictions, some other programs monitor their success or failure and are thus able to 
reinforce the system’s confidence about their effectiveness. Learning a skill consists of learning models and 
their context and sequence of execution, which in AERA result from the assessment of models' performance 
and the detection of novelty (which is how the triggering of new models is implemented), both of which are 
low-level processes in our system. Bad models are  discarded and/or replaced by better  ones.  High-level 
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processes  (planning,  attention,  learning)  influence  each  other  reciprocally:  For  example,  learning  better 
models and sequences thereof improves planning; having good plans means that a system will  direct its 
attention to more (goal-)relevant states, and this means in turn that learning is more likely to be focused on 
changes that impact the system’s mission (e.g. correct identification of novelty), which on average increases 
its chances of success. These high-level processes are dynamically coupled, via the low-level processes, as 
they both result from the execution of the models. 
In our approach cognitive control results from the continual value-driven scheduling of reasoning jobs. In 
this approach high-level cognitive processes are  grounded directly  in the core operation of the machine 
resulting from two complementary control schemes. The first is top-down: Scheduling allocates resources by 
estimating the global value of  the jobs at  hand, and this judgment results directly from the products of 
cognition – goals and predictions.  These are  relevant and accurate  to various extents,  depending on the 
quality of the knowledge accumulated so far. As the latter improves over time, goals and predictions become 
more relevant and accurate, thus allowing the system to allocate its resources with a better judgment; the 
most important goals and the most useful/accurate predictions are considered first, the rest being saved for 
later  processing  or  even  discarded,  thus  saving  resources.  In  that  sense,  cognition  controls  resource 
allocation. The second control scheme is bottom-up: Resource allocation controls cognition. Shall resources 
become scarce (which is virtually always the case in the system-environment-mission triples we target), 
scheduling narrows down the system’s attention to  the  most  important  goals/predictions the system can 
handle, trading scope for efficiency and therefore survivability – the system will only pay attention to the 
most promising (value-wise) inputs and inference possibilities. If the resources become more abundant the 
system will start considering goals and predictions of less immediate value.  
AERA is data- and event-driven, meaning that the execution of code is triggered by matching patterns 
with inputs. The bootstrap code – the initial resource for the system – contains (among other things) drives 
and top-level  models  and top-level goals  (drives).  ('Code'  refers  to  models  (which constitute  executable 
knowledge) that have either been given (as part of the bootstrap code) or learned by the system.) A drive is an 
“innate” goal given by the programmer whose semantics can also be those of a constraint; it is a goal whose 
payload  is  a  fact that  cannot  be  observed  directly  –  think  for  example  of  the  drive  “keep  operating 
successfully”: the environment does not produce explicit  direct evidence of its  achievement,  but several 
indicators can be combined to infer it. A top-level model is hand-crafted for giving the system a way to entail 
the success (or failure) from an observable (such an observable could be “your owner gives you a reward”). 
As  an  AERA-based  system  is  event-driven,  drives  and  top-level  models  form  together  the  system’s 
motivation, providing a top-down impetus for the system's running, while sensors provide an influx of data, 
driving its operation bottom-up. A complete description of AERA can be found in Nivel et al. (2013). 
4. EXPERIMENTS WITH NATURAL COMMUNICATION & LANGUAGE 
The goal of the two experiments, E1 and E2, described here was to assess the ability of our first agent, S1 
implemented in AERA, to learn the pragmatics, semantics, and syntax of human natural communication. We 
wanted an appropriately complex task that put a measure on S1's capability to autonomously disentangle a 
wide  variety  of  causal  relationships,  sufficient  to  convince  us  about  the  generality  of  its  knowledge 
acquisition  and  generalization  capabilities.  Human  natural  multimodal  communication  contains  a  wide 
variety of data types at two orders of magnitude of time. We defined a scenario that included considerable 
spatio-temporal and language behavior complexity: a dyadic mock-television interview. In the experimental 
setup two humans interact for some time, allowing S1 to observe their behavior and interaction; S1's task is 
to  learn  how to  conduct  the  interaction  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  the  humans  do,  in  either  role  of 
interviewer or interviewee. In E1 the interviewer asks the interviewee to pick up objects and move them to 
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new locations on the table between them (Table 1), the interviewee moves the objects as requested but does 
not speak – a kind of put-that-there with learning (Bolt 1980); in E2 the interviewer asks numerous questions 
about the recyclability of the objects on the table between them, the interviewee giving informed answers to 
these (see Table 2). In E2 both interviewer and interviewee use deictics of various kinds and some forms of 
body language (see Table 3). 
The knowledge given to S1 is represented as a small set of primitive commands for its drivers (arm joints 
and speech output) and categories of sensory data (speech, prosody, and joints/geometry), along with a few 
top-level goals such as "pleasing the interviewer" (operationally defined as the interviewer saying "thank 
you" or asking a new question) and "getting the interviewee to speak" (operationally defined as production of 
speech). The full specification of the seed for the two experiments can be found in Nivel & Thórisson (2013). 
S1  observes  the  real-time  interaction  between  the  two  humans  in  a  virtual  equivalent  of  a  video-
conference: The humans are represented as avatars in a virtual environment – to allow the interaction to 
proceed naturally, without any artificial protocols, each human sees the other as a realtime avatar on their 
screen. Their head and arm movements are tracked with motion-sensing technology (with sub-centimeter, 
sub-second  accuracy  and  lag-time),  their  speech  recorded  with  microphones.  Signals  from the  motion-
tracking are used to update the state of their  avatars in real-time, so that everything one human does is 
translated virtually  instantly  into movements  of  her  graphical  avatar  on the other's  screen.  Between the 
avatars is a desk with objects on it, visible to both participants. This is the case in both the human-human 
condition and the human-agent conditions (agent taking either role). In both experiments we had S1 observe 
the humans until it accurately predicted all major event types observed in the dialogue (~2.5 minutes for E1 
and ~20 hours for E2). We then had S1 interact with the humans for a sufficiently long period to produce 
videos (~10 minutes for E1, ~15 minutes for E2) that could be analyzed for t-patterns (Magnusson 2000); 
recordings of S1 interacting in either role with one of the humans (same as who participated in the human-
human scenario) thus formed the basis for data analysis. 
4.1  Experiment 1 (E1)
The objects that the interaction revolves around are: two blue cubes, one red cube, one red sphere, one blue 
sphere. The seed containing all initial (hand-coded) knowledge consisted of a set of primitive commands 
(move hand, grab, release, point at) and a set of dimensions for the input space (object type, color, actor’s 
role,  speech).  The  seed  also  includes  initial  knowledge  that  models  the  consequences  of  invoking  the 
primitive commands: these models are for example explaining how the position of the system’s hand is 
affected by invoking the command move hand and how a hand and an object are  linked together after 
invoking the command grab. The natural language used in E1 consisted of a fixed set of sentence fragments 
(see Table 1). The seed for S1 in E1 is described in detail in Nivel & Thórisson (2013). 
Table 1. The words and word order used in E1. The human participants were asked to "interact normally" to achieve their  
tasks (meaningless sentences – e.g. a sentence starting with "Take it ..." as a first sentence in an interaction, which had no  
prior referent for the ellipsis – were not observed). We did not provide our S1 agent with any grammar or words.
Words Word Order
verbs: put, take
nouns: sphere, cube
adjectives: blue, red
adverb: there
determiners: a, the
pronoun: it
conjunctions: and, ...
interjection (ack): thank you
Utterance: (Part1), Part2
Part1: take, [a | the] noun], (conj)
Part1: take, [it | [a | the] noun], (conj)
Part2: put, [it | [a | the] [blue | red] noun], there, ..., thank you 
(Silence of some measurable length is indicated as "..."; parenthesis means that  
an element is optional.) 
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Results show that the performance of S1 in E1 matches the human-human scenario very closely, and S1 
only needed to observe the humans for around 2.5 minutes before its performance was error-free in either 
role.  A subsequent inspection of S1's realtime performance for 10 minutes,  in real-time interaction with 
humans under the same operating conditions as in the human-human scenario, revealed no mistakes, restarts, 
or self-corrections in the interaction on behalf of S1 – it performed flawlessly and completely error-free. The 
system acquired and generalized interaction skills to a sufficient level to allow it to perform 100% error-free 
communication of the same nature and complexity as that observed in the human-human interaction. S1 
learned the sequences of orders (“take a blue cube...” then wait for the interviewee to comply before adding 
“...and put it there.” and pointing with a finger to a location on the table), and it learned to do this with a 
series of different targets (e.g. a blue cube first, then a red sphere), as demonstrated by the human actors – the 
latter of which results from the hierarchization of control via model affordances. S1 identified the causal 
relationship between deictics  and utterances (e.g.  “there”  correlated with pointing gestures)  –  this  is  an 
example of learned structural hierarchy in the form of composite states – as well as ellipsis (“put it there”). 
The pronoun “it” was learned to identify the object that draws the most attention (in terms of learned job 
priority), i.e. the target of the most valuable goals (picking an object is a learned pre-condition on the next 
step, moving it to some location, to earn the reward) – this is an example of value-driven resource allocation 
steering cognition (and vice-versa); it matches exactly how humans used ellipsis in the observed interactions. 
4.3  Experiment 2 (E2)
Given the success of E1, in E2 we increased the complexity of its task as follows: The scenario included all 
communicative behavior of E1, with a considerably increase in both spatial and language complexity. In 
particular,  the language component  in  E2 included much longer  and more complex sentences,  and both 
interviewee and interviewer generated speech. The vocabulary was 100 words; S1 was given no kind of 
grammar, nor a list of permissible words.4 On the desk between the interviewer and interviewee were a set of 
(virtual) objects: aluminum can, glass bottle, plastic bottle, cardboard box, newspaper and painted wooden 
cube. As before, the task of the participants is to talk about these objects, in particular, the interviewer's task 
is to ask the interviewee about the materials which the various objects are made of, and the pros, cons, cost, 
and methods for recycling them. As in E1, the interviewee must understand the utterances of the interviewer 
to a sufficient degree to produce the desired actions,5 in this case long explanations about the pros and cons o 
recycling various kinds of materials,  using deictic references,  ellipsis,  and standard human dialogue and 
turntaking skills. 
S1 observes two humans interacting; participants in all sessions were not trained actors. They interacted 
according to the targeted set of behaviors (see Table 2 and Table 3). The sequence of their actions and the use 
of multimodal deictics was free-form and real-time, the interaction semi-improvised. The human participants 
tried to not make mistakes, but occasional errors were unavoidable as all sessions were live and non-scripted, 
of several minutes each. As before, for the natural language no formal grammar definitions were produced  or 
given to S1, nor a list of permissible sentences. The sessions proceeded as in E1; we had S1 observe until it 
could perform in either role without making any mistakes. 
4 Due to the number of commission errors in the speech recognizer, however, its output was filtered by the set of 100  
words.
5 While the humans in the experiments are not trained actors and their behavior is not stylized, their interaction was  
nevertheless correct in all major aspects – all question-answer pairs are correct and consistent. S1 thus does not have  
to deal with incorrect language, which would undoubtedly bring the observation time well above 20 hours.
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Table 2. Some examples of the unscripted sentences produced by the E2 human participants in realtime dialogue.
Which releases more greenhouse gasses when produced, [an aluminum can or a glass bottle | an 
aluminum can or a plastic bottle | a plastic bottle or a glass bottle]?
What [else | more] can you [tell, tell me, tell us, say] about [this | that | it]?
There are many types of plastic.
Tell [me | us] about this [object | thing | one].
More energy is needed to recycle a plastic bottle than a can of aluminum. 
Compared to recycled plastic, new plastic releases fifty percent more greenhouse gasses. 
More energy is needed to recycle a glass bottle than a can of aluminum. 
A glass bottle takes one million years to disintegrate completely in the sun.
Glass is made by melting together several minerals.
A recycled aluminum-can pollutes (only) five percent of what a new [can | one] pollutes.
Recycling an aluminum-can costs only five percent of a new one.
Compared to recycling, making new paper produces thirty-five percent more water pollution.
This is a cube made from unpainted wood. 
The results of E2 are summarized in Table 3. In E2 S1 learned everything that it observed in the human-
human interactions, and can perform an equivalent interview in either role of interviewer and interviewee.6 
The full socio-communicative repertoire exemplified in E1, with additional complexity in deictic gestures 
and grammar, acquired autonomously by S1 after an observation period of approximately 20 hours, has been 
correctly learned, with no mistakes in its subsequent application, including timing of all actions.
5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
We have demonstrated an implemented architecture that can learn autonomously many things in parallel, at 
multiple time scales. The results show that the AERA-based S1 agent can learn complex multi-dimensional 
tasks from observation from only a small ontology, a few drives (high-level goals), and a few initial domain 
models to support autonomous bootstrapping on a complex task. Human dialogue is an excellent example of 
the kinds of complex tasks current systems are incapable of handling autonomously, and to our knowledge no 
prior architecture has demonstrated comparable results (cf. Franklin et al. 2013, Laird 2012, Wang 2011). 
The fact that no difference of any importance can be seen in the performance between S1 and the humans in 
simulated face-to-face interview is an indication that the resulting architecture holds significant potential for 
further advances, and that our methodology (Nivel et al. 2013, Thórisson 2012) is a way for escaping the 
constraints of current computer science and engineering software methodologies when aiming for artificial 
general intelligence and increased systems autonomy. However, in its current incarnation AERA is entirely 
dependent  on  observation,  as  learning  is  exclusively  triggered  by  unexpected  goal  achievement,  or  a 
prediction  that  turns  out  to  be  wrong  –  i.e.  by  surprise.  This  limits  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  to 
phenomena that are directly observable – hidden causation is difficult for the current system to figure out, as 
are other kinds of inexplicit relations (similarity, equivalence, etc.). One of the main directions of our planned 
near-future work is set toward building more prototypes to assess the generality and scalability of our system. 
Elsewhere we have argued that curiosity results from the need to overcome the limitations imposed by the 
scarcity of inputs (Steunebrink et al. 2013); we plan to expand the types of programs to implement a richer 
6 Videos of the interaction can be found on www.humanobs.org and on youtube.com on channel CADIAvideos.
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set  of  inferences  from which  curious  behaviors  can  be  devised  and  planned,  whenever  the  system has 
resources to spare. 
Table 3. Summary of results obtained in Experiment 2 (E2). S1 has learned how to conduct an interview with a human,  
and can perform flawlessly in either role of interviewer and interviewee after around 20 hours of observation, producing  
grammatically, semantically, and pragmatically correct utterances in interactions spanning tens of seconds. Our S1 agent  
was not provided with any grammar or words.
 Category What Has Been Learned Result
Interview 
gross  
structure 
S1 has learned how to structure dialogue in an interview, 
as observed in the human-human interaction. S1 has 
learned roles of both interviewer and interviewee from 
observation, having been only provided with the top-
level goals for either, and can perform them both. S1 
also learned to use interruption to keep the interview 
within the allowed time limits. 
S1 can conduct dialogue with a human 
efficiently and effectively, as interviewer and 
interviewee, in a way that is virtually 
identical to human-human interaction. 
Appropriate and correct actions taken, given 
the behavior of either role. 
Turn-taking S1 has learned the basic skills of turn-taking form 
observation, as plainly obvious in the videos, and clearly 
demarcated in turn-taking patterns shown by t-pattern 
analysis. In E2 the interview includes gestures and 
speech for both roles. Turn-taking is slightly slower-
paced than typical human-human interaction.
S1 efficiently and effectively takes turns, 
asking questions at the right times (as 
interviewer) and answers timed correctly (as 
interviewee). The style and action repertoire 
is precisely that observed in the human-
human condition. 
Explicit  
manual  
deictics
S1 has learned to use three kinds of deictics: pointing by 
finger, by palm, and picking up and putting down an 
object in synchrony with speech. Successful resolution 
of a manual deictic gesture by the interviewer allows 
interviewee to produce correct answer to questions, and 
to use it reciprocally when replying. 
Both the timing and form of the gestures is 
appropriate for the context. Resolution of a 
manual deictic gesture by the interviewer 
allows interviewee to place objects in the 
right location, and to pick out a referenced 
object out of the five.
Ellipsis Use of pronoun "it" and "the [X]" (e.g. "Take the cube" 
in the beginning of a new instruction) is correctly used to 
reference (as interviewer) / interpreted (as interviewee) 
an object mentioned earlier. 
S1 has learned to use ellipsis in both 
sentence interpretation and generation. 
Successful resolution of ellipsis by S1 as 
interviewee allows it to place objects in the 
right location, and to pick out a referenced 
object out of the five. 
Sentence 
construction 
S1 constructs all sentences correctly  Correct 
combination of dialogue events to allow correct uses of 
pronoun and adverb, supporting disambiguation/ 
indication of what should be done.
S1 can construct sentences in either role of 
interviewer and interviewee, based on those 
observed in the human-human interaction. 
The sequence of words is produced using 
generalized models acquired autonomously 
from observing the human interaction.
Constructing 
proper answer  
to questions
When the interviewer asked a question, not only were 
the gestures and speech interpreted for the correct 
response, the reply constructed was appropriate to the 
question. 
Given the numerous valid questions that can 
be asked in E2, S1 replies with an 
appropriate and correct utterance. 
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